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H. P. Grice is widely accredited with the discovery of implicature, that which is not literally said by 
a sentence but is nonetheless conveyed when used in a conversational context, creating a theory 
which has had a tremendous influence on the study of pragmatics. However, in this essay I shall be 
arguing  that  beyond  the  very  intuitive  notion  that  implicature  exists,  the  system  that  Grice 
constructs to explain and predict it in Logic and Conversation1 is incomplete in several devastating 
ways, which eventually leads to the need for its extensive refinement and additional elements to 
form a complete whole. It is often commented that Grice’s system is too vague to commit him to 
anything, however, Grice does make several definite claims and it is my aim to show that these 
cannot properly or fully characterise how implicature work.
I shall now first discuss how the different elements of Grice’s project are used to construct a 
theory  explaining  implicature  and  its  use  in  language.  Grice’s  system  of  implicature  focuses 
particularly on what he labels conversational implicature, characterised chiefly by his Cooperative 
Principle and its four associated maxims, which is a “subclass of non-conventional implicature”2. 
The Co-operative Principle is the following rough guide Grice lays out: “Make your conversational 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction 
of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”3. Grice believes that fundamental to our ability to 
create implicature in conversations is the fact that they are not a disjoint series of sentences, but 
mutually inter-related contributions to a collective effort. He argues that we can distinguish these 
cooperative linguistic transactions by the fact that participants have a common immediate aim to 
appropriately  exchange  the  correct  information,  that  contributions  are  dependent  on  other 
participants and responsive to their input and that both parties expect the conversation to continue in 
a suitable manner unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate. 
The assumption that the Cooperative Principle is being observed can then be combined with 
his more specific maxims to deduce what is being implicated in a sentence. These maxims are 
Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner and are described thus:
Quantity: Use the correct level of informativeness when speaking, namely:
1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the 
exchange).
2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.4
Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true, namely:
1) Do not say what you believe to be false.
2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Relation: Be relevant.
Manner: Be perspicuous, namely:
1) Avoid obscure expressions.
2) Avoid ambiguity.
3) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4) Be orderly.
1 Putnam, H. P., “Logic and Conversation” in A. P. Martinich (ed.) The Philosophy of Language pp. 171-181.
2 Ibid., pp. 173.
3 Ibid
4 This second part of the maxim of Quantity is not held to be as certain by Grice, who suspects that the same effect is 
assured by the maxim of Relation.
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Another vital component of Grice’s scheme is the ability of either participant to fail to fulfil 
a maxim. This can occur when a person violates a maxim quietly either intentionally to mislead or 
unwittingly; when a person makes it clear that they are opting out, such as in the case of secret-
keeping; when a clash of maxims occurs forcing the person to violate one; or finally they may 
intentionally flout a maxim by blatantly failing to fulfil it. 
Now Grice can define formally that a person A saying p has conversationally implicated q if and 
only if:
1) A can be presumed to be following the Cooperative Principle.
2) In order for p to be consistent with (1), it must further be supposed that A is aware that, or 
thinks that q.
3) A thinks that it is within the capacities of the listener to correctly deduce or intuitively grasp 
that (2) is required.
Furthermore, Grice employs what we shall refer to as the Calculability Condition, “the presence of 
conversational implicatures must be capable of being worked out; for even if it can be intuitively 
grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not 
count as a conversational implicature; it will be a conventional implicature”5. 
Conversational implicature in its simplest terms then is just an acknowledgement that in 
conversation  not  everything needs  explicit  statement  to  be  understood by both parties.  A basic 
example of conversational implicature may be:
Anne: I’m thirsty.
Brian: There’s some milk in the fridge.
Analysed just on what is explicit in Brian’s utterance, it would be concluded that it is unrelated to 
Anne’s. However,  if  it  can be assumed for condition (1) that  Brian is  obeying the Cooperative 
Principle then we can see that in order for Brian’s input to be consistent with it we must suppose 
that Brian is conversationally implicating something so (2) holds. By the maxim of Relation, we can 
suppose  that  Brian  following  the  Cooperative  Principle  implies  that  his  statement  is  relevant, 
therefore Anne can conclude that Brian means and is implicating that the milk in the fridge would 
quench her thirst, that it hasn’t gone off, that she is allowed to drink it and all things which seem 
naturally implied by Brian’s statement. These all seem obvious so clearly condition (3) holds, as 
Brian could reasonably expect Anne to work all of these implicatures out.
Grice  also  argues  that  conversational  implicature  can  be  generated  by the  flouting  of  a 
maxim of conversation. This occurs when it can still be assumed that the person you are talking to 
is obeying the Cooperative Principle but yet they blatantly flout one of the maxims, so for condition 
(1) to be consistent with what has been said it can be further assumed that their flouting of the 
maxim was being employed in order to conversationally implicate something. We shall briefly give 
examples of how this may be done for each maxim. The classic Gricean example of flouting the 
maxim of Quantity is that of the philosophy professor being asked to provide a reference for a bad 
student and writes “the student has excellent handwriting and regularly attended lectures”, thereby 
providing insufficient  information to  satisfy the maxim of  Quantity,  thus  implicating that  there 
nothing better  to  say about  the  student  without  breaching the social  convention of  not  writing 
negative references. An example of a breach of the maxim of Quality is sarcasm, where someone 
says something blatantly untrue with the implicatum that the opposite is in fact true, like “joining 
scientology is  a really good idea” or “Britney Spears  has produced some excellent music”.  An 
example of breaking the maxim of relation may be when the subject is changed suddenly, with the 
implicature that a taboo has been broached or that a person that was being talked about has just 
5 Ibid., pp. 174.
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entered the room. Breaking the maxim of Manner could be exemplified when adults are speaking in 
the presence of a child, if they speak in intentionally obscure language, then it may implicate that 
what they are saying is not intended for the child to understand.
We  have  thus  laid  out  Grice’s  theory  and  seen  how  he  believes  that  conversational 
implicature is generated. I shall now argue that despite the apparent plausibility of this system and 
the seemingly successful examples of its  application,  there are several  key reasons that Grice’s 
schema fails to hold generally. Firstly, the problem of differentiation shows examples of what is 
calculable as implicature according to Grice’s schema but intuitively isn’t. Secondly, the mutual 
knowledge assumption does not avoid this sufficiently. Thirdly, despite the crucial role Grice gives 
to the Calculability condition, there is no need for conversational implicature to obey it. Fourthly, 
the Cooperative Principle needs to be simply assumed to be being followed, but this assumption 
may  plausibly  fail.  Lastly,  the  Cooperative  Principle  is  an  arbitrary  way  of  distinguishing 
conversational implicature from similar phenomena which can be created without it, suggesting that 
it is not the reason for the generation of this type of implicatures.
The most widespread criticism of Grice’s system is advanced by W. Davis, who argues that 
“for nearly every implicature correctly predicted by Gricean theory, others are falsely predicted”6 
and that  conversely “implicatures exist  that  cannot be derived from conversational principles”7. 
Davis’ criticism focuses mainly on the failure of the maxim of Quantity to be sufficient to explain 
implicatures which Grice’s system would need the maxim to calculate. Consider, for example, Antti 
saying “Some papers at the Reading Party were good”.  By the maxim of Quantity,  operating a 
Gricean calculation on this, it would be reasoned that if Antti can be assumed to be following the 
Cooperative Principle then he will be trying to be as informative as is appropriate for the current 
purposes of the conversation, so if it had been the case that all of the papers were good he would 
have said so, therefore we can take Antti to have implicated the denial of the stronger statement “All 
papers at the Reading Party were good”. However, the problem of apparent plausibility applies here 
because although it  appears that  the reasoning is  sound and that Grice’s theory has adequately 
explained and predicted the implicature, we can easily consider other cases where like reasoning is 
applied to like cases but yet the derived prediction of implicature would be false. For instance, take 
the following sentences:
All but one of the papers at the Reading Party were good.
Three of the papers at the Reading Party were good.
The papers by the German students at the Reading Party were good.
Half of the papers at the Reading Party were good.
All of these are stronger statements and more informative than “Some papers at the Reading Party 
were good”, but the fact that Antti used this sentence does not imply the denial of any of these other 
sentences in the same way that it implicates the denial of “All papers at the Reading Party were 
good”. However, the reasoning is the same so by Grice’s system these implicatures should also 
hold. It would be spurious to try to argue against this from any of the other maxims: it can’t be said 
that these alternatives would have been over-informative so the implicature doesn’t hold for them, 
since they are just as appropriate to the conversation as what Antti did say. It equally can’t be said to 
be breaking the maxim of Manner for not being brief, since none of these sentences are particularly 
lengthy or complex. It seems we can conclude that Grice’s theory over-predicts implicatures so we 
can accuse Grice of post hoc reasoning in the cases where the implicature of a weaker statement to 
the negation of a stronger statement is invoked because Grice would use the cases in which this is 
successful to support his claim without discussion of the cases which fail to hold. It could be argued 
6Davis, W., “Implicature: intention, convention, and principle in the failure of Gricean theory”, pp. 33.
7 Ibid.
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that attributing successful implicatures to the maxim of Quantity is therefore incorrect because if the 
maxim was in general operation it would lead to far more incorrect implicatures being predicted.
We could  consider  the  maxim of  Quality  to  suffer  the  same problems:  Grice  attributes 
sarcasm, irony, metaphor, understatements, exaggeration and hyperbole all to flouting the maxim of 
Quality and thereby using implicature to create these phenomena. However, having already seen the 
problems for the maxim of Quantity, it seems unlikely that the same reasoning will hold in all cases 
that Grice’s theory would predict it for. Our original example of flouting the maxim of Quality was 
sarcasm  in  which  something  blatantly  untrue  was  used  to  imply  the  opposite,  but  it  is 
straightforward to find examples where this doesn’t hold. For example, if I say to my sister “Your 
face is absolutely hideous”, this is obviously not true but doesn’t implicate the opposite, instead it 
suggests I am trying to annoy her. Grice might respond to this that he acknowledges there may be 
“all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social or moral in character) such as ‘Be polite,’ that are also 
normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate non-conventional 
implicatures”8. Then it could be argued that when talking to my sister I was flouting the maxim of 
Politeness to annoy her. However, this response is inadequate since clearly what I am saying is also 
violating the maxim of Quality as already stated, so Grice’s theory provides no clear reason to apply 
one maxim rather than the other when calculating the implicature. The only way that it is decided 
that in one case I was being sarcastic while in the other I was annoying my sister is because we 
intuitively decide which is which, not because Grice’s system has any way of doing this. In fact, it 
seems that the Calculability Condition needs an extension such that it is not just required that there 
is a way of working out the implicature by argument, but also that there is only one applicable 
deduction in each case9. 
It has been replied to the general problems of differentiation that these can be overcome by 
contexts and mutual knowledge, which are included by Grice in his system. However, I will now 
argue that this is insufficient to make Grice’s system a comprehensive theory of implicature. For 
example, the argument could run that in my earlier example of Antti implicating which papers were 
good at the reading party, it could be the case that if there was mutual knowledge between him and 
his listener that Antti hates Germans then he could have been implicating that it wasn’t the case that 
the papers by the German students were good10. However, we could now ask how the listener is to 
conclude whether Antti was just implicating the negation of all papers being good, or whether he 
meant any one of the others: the mutual knowledge that Antti hates German students could give his 
listener  another  viable  option  for  what  Antti  might  be  implicating  but  it  does  not  in  any way 
convince us that the listener will figure it out correctly. Mutual knowledge does seem to be essential 
for  implicature  to  be  created:  without  the  mutual  knowledge  of  particular  facts,  certain 
interpretations of what is being implicated by the speaker will seem less viable. However, it does 
not seem that this rescues the theory because it still does not avoid the need for post hoc reasoning 
where  the  correct  implicatum  is  needed  to  be  known  before  an  adequate  description  of  its 
calculation  can  be  given,  so  it  seems  that  Grice’s  project  is  incomplete  on  this  point.  Mutual 
knowledge does not directly imply that contextual implicatures will be deducible.
The next objection we have to offer against Grice’s system is directed at the Calculability 
Condition.  There  is  a  curious  gap  in  Grice’s  argument  between  speaker-meaning  and  listener-
interpretation.  It  may be argued that  conversational  implicature is  predominantly an act  by the 
speaker: that although it is standard for it to be used in a Cooperative effort there is no strict need 
for it to be worked out. For example, someone smug may, in a conversation fully abiding by the 
Cooperative Principle, subtly implicate things that they are nearly certain the listener won’t pick up 
8 Grice, pp. 174.
9 There is the problem here that a sentence may be used for different things in different contexts ergo there shouldn’t be 
a unique deduction clause. However, it does seem that for a sentence in one context there should be only one argument 
to apply to it in order to calculate the correct implicatum. Yet, literature and poetry often make use of these ambiguities 
in language, so maybe our new restriction would have to be in some way limited.
10 This response was raised by Antti himself at the reading party!
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on just to feel self-satisfied and witty. It does not strike us that what would count as conversational 
implicature if the listener was more intelligent fails to be in this case because this isn’t the case. The 
problem for Grice then resides in the fact that his calculation schema is directed at the listener, 
while instead, as H. H. Clark puts it “paradoxically, he expressed the maxims as exhortations to 
speakers”11.  If  the listener  is  incapable of grasping the implicature,  and furthermore by Grice’s 
condition replacing that intuition by a reasoned argument from the Cooperative Principle and the 
maxims, then Grice claims that it is not conversational implicature but conventional implicature. 
Yet  it  seems  that  what  counts  as  conversational  and  conventional  implicature  should  not  be 
determined by the listener’s ability to interpret, so Grice has been lead to an unappealing result. 
Also, there are many situations where listeners pick up on implicatures that the speaker may not 
have been initially aware of, such as accidental puns and innuendo, which would be inconsistent 
with Grice’s scheme if required to be conversational implicature. Yet the only other person we could 
allow to be the judge of calculability is the speaker herself  which cannot be acceptable or else 
thinking  you  were  conversationally  implicating  something  would  be  the  same  as  actually 
implicating it. For example, a speaker who is distracted may leave out a vital part of the sentence in 
which  he  would  have  been  using  conversational  implicature,  thus  believes  he  is  implicating 
something while actually not doing so. 
It could be argued then that the Calculability Condition in these problem cases should not be 
about  either  the  listener’s  or  speaker’s  capability  to  calculate,  but  rather  that  of  some kind  of 
objective  impartial  observer.  However,  it  would  be  undesirable  to  introduce  the  need  for  an 
impartial observer, since it unclear as to the calculating power that this observer should be endowed 
with. For instance, if we take the example of a listener picking up on additional implicatures from 
before,  but  suppose that for the same sentence the listener  does not pick up on this  accidental 
innuendo:  if  the  impartial  observer  is  capable  of  working  this  out  then  there  is  conversational 
implicature that neither the speaker nor the listener are aware of, which seems flawed. The best 
suggestion along the same lines is the suggestion that it is not an actual observer so the condition 
could be phrased as “what a reasonable person could work out”. This seems the best option we have 
considered, but is beyond the scope of Grice’s own position and may give rise to further dangers in 
introducing a modal notion to characterise implicatures.
A further objection to Grice is that condition (1) is unashamedly phrased as a necessary 
presumption for any conversational implicature to occur. Yet it doesn’t seem to be so unusual for at 
least some part of the Cooperative Principle to fail: for instance, someone may not be making their 
conversational contribution as is required in order to mislead or withhold information, or they may 
not accept the same direction or purpose as you do. This does not seem to be so extreme as to be a 
sceptical argument, since it actually strikes me as fairly commonplace that people are lying, holding 
back, talking at crossed purposes or past each other. To simply presume that this isn’t occurring in 
order for the theory to work seems optimistic at best, naïve and unlikely to hold true. Also, it then 
seems  that  despite  a  failure  in  one  of  these  ways,  the  cooperative  elements  required  for 
conversational implicatures to hold may still occur, so it may be the case that Grice’s definition of 
conversational implicature and how it is generated may need refining. How to do this within his 
system, however, is not entirely clear.
In fact, there may be more to this story. I shall now contend that the phenomena that Grice is 
trying to characterise within his system actually occur outside of its scope too, showing that Grice 
has over restricted his theory and that it thereby cannot be a full embodiment of the phenomena he 
is attempting to explain. More specifically, whichever way you interpret the Cooperative Principle it 
cuts out too many of the cases in which implicatures that intuitively belong in Grice’s schema are 
present. I shall look at examples of the cross-examination of witnesses and interrogations. In both 
examples  it  is  actually  reasonable  to  expect  uncooperativeness  as  described  in  the  previous 
paragraph
11 Clark, H. H., “Using Language”, pp. 142.
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paragraph. In the case of cross-examination, consider a witness who is trying to avoid incriminating 
himself being examined by a lawyer:
Lawyer: What were you doing on the night of the 13th?
Witness: I was at a party until eight. I had work in the morning.
Although it is clear that the witness may be being vague deliberately to avoid incrimination, so has 
intentionally not explicitly stated that he went home for work in the morning, it also seems clear 
that  there  is  implicature  to  the  effect  that  the  witness  wants  us  to  think  that.  However,  the 
Cooperative Principle could be argued to not be in effect: the witness is definitely not accepting the 
same purpose as the lawyer as one wants to incriminate the other while the other is actively trying 
to avoid this happening. Furthermore, the witness clearly didn’t make his contribution as is required 
by the lawyer’s purpose for the conversation. It could be responded by Grice that in his theory 
conversational implicature is only a subclass of non-conventional implicature, and that this type of 
situation is in a separate subclass. However, this response doesn’t seem to hold because here the 
method of generating implicature seems to be the same as in a situation Grice would describe as 
conversational implicature- the lack of Cooperative Principle has changed the context but not really 
affected the implicature itself, why then must it be moved to a different subclass of implicature? 
Grice’s  requirement  for  the  Cooperative  Principle  to  hold  seems  an  arbitrary categorisation  of 
implicature types. 
A further response to our example could be that although the witness and the lawyer had 
differing motivations in the cross-examination, they both accepted some general direction of the 
talk like “the completion of the cross-examination in a just manner” which was furthermore the 
accepted purpose due to there being a court full of people as witness to this being completed. This 
exposes an ambiguity in the Cooperative Principle: who exactly is meant to be “accepting” the 
purpose of the talk? Is it the speaker, the listener the statement is aimed at, the extended crowd of all 
those listening or some combination of all of these? Although Grice would clearly prefer the latter 
option,  our  example  has  already  demonstrated  that  this  needn’t  hold  since  implicature  was 
generated despite a lack of cooperation. To consider an even less clear example, I shall examine a 
torture scenario, where once again there is an attempt to extract information from a subject. This 
time there is no crowd to coerce the witness into an unwilling cooperation. In fact, even Grice’s 
most  general  statement  that  “at  each  stage,  some conversational  moves  would  be  excluded  as 
conversationally unsuitable” doesn’t seem to flow since a subject being tortured may come out with 
all kinds of gibberish at any stage, but yet this doesn’t mean that the subject couldn’t alternate 
between that and sentences which do conversationally implicate. The Cooperative Principle thus 
seems untenable as a condition for conversational implicature to hold to necessarily, especially if it 
to include all of the conversational phenomena which seem appropriate to include as the same type 
of implicature. Once again, the Cooperative Principle appears to be an arbitrary categorisation of 
implicature types.
In conclusion, we have shown that there are several crucial problems for the claims Grice 
makes. Firstly, the problem of differentiation shows that although there may be maxims at work, the 
ones  that  Grice  makes  explicit  only  capture  a  part  of  how  these  implicatures  are  created. 
Furthermore, there is a clear need for an explanation of how we do figure out implicatures correctly 
according to Grice’s schema. Secondly, we showed that although theoretically mutual knowledge 
and context should play an important role in implicatures, the way they are invoked by Grice does 
not seem to capture their importance. Thirdly, the Calculability Condition is clearly one that cannot 
be sustained: not only is it unclear precisely who should be able to create the “reasoned argument” 
Grice requires, but it also seems perfectly plausible for the actual use of language to be of such 
complexity for this condition not to hold despite our ability to intuitively figure out implicatures. 
Finally, the Cooperative Principle is something that Grice strongly commits himself to, but yet does 
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not seem to be the crucial element for distinguishing non-conventional implicatures. So it can be 
concluded  that  although  there  are  parts  of  Grice’s  theory  which  do  capture  aspects  of  how 
implicatures work,  overall  the theory is  incomplete  and several  of the commitments that  Grice 
thinks conversational implicatures do have to make do not hold up to closer scrutiny.
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